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INTRODUCTION
In spring of 2010, Anthony Elonis’s wife left him, taking their two
children with her.1 Shortly thereafter, Elonis began posting violent and
degrading material, frequently styled as “rap lyrics,” on Facebook.2 After
Elonis posted an illustrated diagram depicting his wife’s home and
provided hypothetical instructions on the best way to “fire a mortar
launcher at her house,” she sought a protective order.3 Elonis learned of
the order and redirected the focus of his threatening posts to include
police officers, FBI agents, and even a kindergarten class.4
A grand jury indicted Elonis for five counts of violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 875(c), a federal statute criminalizing the transmission of “any
communication containing any threat . . . to injure the person of another.”5
At trial, Elonis asked the court to instruct the jury that “the government
must prove that he intended to communicate a true threat.”6 The district
* J.D. 2016, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.S. 2013, University of
Florida. I would like to thank Cole Barnett for his advice and encouragement while writing this
Comment. Thank you to our former faculty advisor, Professor Dennis Calfee, for all that he has
done to make the Florida Law Review an amazing organization. I would also like to thank my
family for their love and support throughout my time in law school. Finally, I want to thank the
staff and members of the Florida Law Review for their hard work on this Comment and for the
Review in general. I am honored to have been part of it.
1. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2004 (2015).
2. See id. at 2004–07.
3. Id. at 2005–06.
4. Id. at 2006–07.
5. Id. at 2007 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 875(c) (2012)).
6. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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court declined and instead instructed the jury to use an objective,
“reasonable person” standard; the jury subsequently found Elonis guilty
of four of the five counts against him.7 Elonis filed an appeal in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, challenging the district court’s
jury instruction, but the Third Circuit found no error in the instruction and
affirmed the lower court’s judgment.8 In 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari, and in 2015 it reviewed and reversed the Third
Circuit’s decision.9 The Court looked to the principles underlying
criminal law and statutory construction and concluded a reasonable
person standard, by itself, is not enough to justify criminal liability.10 The
Court instead held that a defendant convicted under § 875(c) must have
subjective intent to convey a threat.11 Despite its willingness to require a
subjective intent standard, the Court refused to specify which level of
intent—recklessness or knowledge—would suffice to violate the statute,
nor did it address the apparent First Amendment concerns relevant to the
decision.12 Lower courts must now find their own answers to the intent
question and hope that their choice fits within the additional restraints
imposed by the First Amendment.
I. HISTORY OF § 875(C)
In its earliest form, § 875(c) criminalized threats mailed with the
“intent to extort.”13 Several years after the statute’s enactment, Congress
revised it to prohibit all threats to injure another person, regardless of
whether the threat accompanied an extortion attempt.14 Although the
original statute required “intent” behind the communication, the current
version of § 875(c) prohibits “any communication containing any

7. United States v. Elonis, 897 F. Supp. 2d 335, 341–42 (E.D. Penn. 2012), aff’d, 730 F.3d
321 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). In full, the court instructed the jury that:
A statement is made a true threat when a defendant intentionally makes a
statement in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person
would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the
maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to
inflict bodily injury or take the life of an individual.
Id. at 341 n.5.
8. United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 327, 335 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2001
(2015).
9. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2008, 2012.
10. See id. at 2009–11.
11. Id.
12. See id. at 2012.
13. Pub. L. No. 76-76, § 1(c), 53 Stat. 742 (1939).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 408d(b) (1940).
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threat.”15 The disappearance of the statute’s intent element received little
attention or explanation,16 and courts slowly began applying the statute’s
plain language—requiring only that the defendant “knowingly”
transmitted the communication.17
The Supreme Court confirmed Congress’s authority to regulate threats
in Watts v. United States.18 In Watts, the Court considered the
constitutionality of a statute that prohibited “any person from ‘knowingly
and willfully [making] any threat’” to kill or injure the President.19 The
Court acknowledged that the country has a valid interest in protecting its
President from the fear and interference caused by threats, but tempered
its finding with the warning that courts must interpret any statute
criminalizing pure speech within the bounds of the First Amendment.20
With this ruling, the Court established an exception to the First
Amendment for “true threats” and implicitly confirmed the
constitutionality of other federal threat statutes, including § 875(c).
In 2003, the Supreme Court again considered the constitutionality of
a threat statute. Virginia v. Black21 involved a Virginia statute “banning
cross burning with ‘an intent to intimidate a person or group of
persons.’”22 The primary First Amendment concerns arose not from the
statute itself but from the instruction to a jury “that the burning of a cross
by itself is sufficient evidence from which you may infer the required
intent.”23 The Court gave great weight to the intimidation and hatred that
have long accompanied cross burnings.24 However, the plurality reasoned
15. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012) (emphasis added).
16. See Thomas “Tal” DeBauche, Note, Bursting Bottles: Doubting the Objective-Only
Approach to 18 U.S.C. 875(c) in Light of United States v. Jeffries and the Norms of Online Social
Networking, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 981, 996–97 (2014).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Holder, 302 F. Supp. 296, 300 (D. Mont. 1969) (“It is
sufficient to establish a specific intent to communicate a threat to injure . . . , i.e. the
communication of the threat must be done ‘knowingly’ and not ‘because of mistake or
inadvertence or other innocent reason.’”), aff’d, 427 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1970).
18. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
19. Id. at 705, 707.
20. Id. at 707 (“What is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally
protected speech.”).
21. 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (plurality opinion).
22. Id. at 347 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1996)).
23. Id. at 349 (internal quotation marks omitted). The jury instruction was based on a
provision from the statute which read: “Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence
of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons.” Id. at 348 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Court explained that the Virginia Supreme Court had never clarified the meaning
of that provision. Id. at 364.
24. Id. at 352–57. For this reason, the plurality concluded that the statute itself was
constitutional because a cross burning “with an intent to intimidate” constitutes a “true threat,”
which the First Amendment does not protect. Id. at 359–60. The Court elaborated:
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that under some circumstances a cross burning can be “core political
speech.”25 Because the First Amendment may, under some
circumstances, protect a cross burning, and because the statute expressly
required an intent to intimidate, the jury instruction’s interpretation of the
statute was unconstitutional.26 The Court vacated Black’s conviction
because the instruction permitted the jury to ignore “all of the contextual
factors that are necessary to decide whether a particular cross burning is
intended to intimidate.”27
Although Black was a plurality opinion on a fairly specific
construction of a state statute, the circuit courts began hearing arguments
that the “intent” reasoning from Black should apply to threats in cases
brought under § 875(c).28 Generally, § 875(c) is divided into two
elements: first, a communication must be transmitted, and second, the
communication must contain a threat.29 With regard to the first element,
courts typically maintained that defendants only needed to have “general
intent” to “knowingly” transmit the message to be convicted under the
statute.30 Likewise, the majority of circuits dismissed the possibility that
the statute’s second element required that defendants have a separate,
“True threats” encompass those statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. The speaker need not
actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats
“protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence” and “from the disruption that
fear engenders,” in addition to protecting people “from the possibility that the
threatened violence will occur.”
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
388 (1992)).
25. Id. at 365.
26. Id. at 363–64.
27. Id. at 367. Note that the Court did not strike down the entire statute. Id. Instead, the
Court left it to the Virginia courts to determine whether the statute could ever be interpreted in a
way that complied with the First Amendment. Id.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 736 F.3d 981, 985 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Martinez
argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia v. Black draws the distinction between true
threats and protected speech based on the speaker’s subjective intent.”), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2798
(2015), to be considered in light of Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
29. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2008 (2015). Some interpretations of the
statute identify a third, interstate commerce element. See, e.g., id. at 2014 (Alito, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Any difference between the two tests, however, has no bearing on the
discussion within this Comment.
30. See, e.g., United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 508 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding § 875(c) to
be a “general intent crime”), abrogated by 810 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Stewart,
411 F.3d 825, 827 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2005) (“When the word knowingly is used in these instructions,
it means that the Defendant realized what he was doing and was aware of the nature of his conduct
and did not act through ignorance or mistake or accident.”).
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subjective intent to make a threat.31 Whether the message constituted a
“true threat,” and thus was not entitled to First Amendment protection,
hinged on how an objective, reasonable person would interpret the
statement.32 Because the threatening nature of a message was determined
without reference to the defendant’s intention or understanding, there was
little room for defendants to challenge the second element. Thus,
defendants were only able to introduce somewhat subjective evidence to
challenge the first element. For example, a defendant could attempt to
defend himself by arguing that he sent the message by mistake.33
By 2015, only two circuits—the Ninth and Tenth Circuits—had
adopted an additional requirement that a defendant have subjective intent
to make a threat.34 The Model Penal Code lists four levels of intent, from
greatest to least culpability: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and
negligence.35 Of these categories, only purpose, knowledge, and
recklessness require “subjective intent.”36 Thus, courts applying a
subjective test ask whether the defendant communicated a message with
the purpose of making a threat, was “practically certain” the recipient
would view the message as a threat, or consciously disregarded a
“substantial and unjustifiable risk” the recipient would understand the
message as a threat.37 While the Tenth Circuit requires some subjective
31. See United States v. Clemens, 738 F.3d 1, 9–12 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Turner,
720 F.3d 411, 420 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 49 (2014); United States v. Elonis, 730
F.3d 321, 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015); United States v. Nicklas, 713
F.3d 435, 440 (8th Cir. 2013); Martinez, 736 F.3d at 988; White, 670 F.3d at 508; United States
v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 477–79 (6th Cir. 2012); Stewart, 411 F.3d at 828; Porter v. Ascension
Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616 (5th Cir. 2004). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia did not decide the issue before the Supreme Court decided Elonis.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287, 293 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013) (“A statement or
communication is a threat if it was made under such circumstances that a reasonable person
hearing or reading the statement or receiving the communication would understand it as a serious
expression of an intent to inflict injury.”). The majority of circuits used an objective test that
looked to the reaction of the reasonable recipient, but a few courts used an alternative test that
weighed the reasonable defendant’s ability to foresee that the recipient would view the message
as a threat. See United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997) (reviewing the
various objective standards employed by other circuit courts).
33. See Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1493 (instructing the jury that the defendant “knowingly”
transmitted the message if he “did not act out of ignorance, mistake, or accident”).
34. See United States v. Heineman, 767 F.3d 970, 978 (10th Cir. 2014); United States v.
Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1988).
35. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)–(d) (2015).
36. See Karen Rosenfield, Note, Redefining the Question: Applying a Hierarchical
Structure to the Mens Rea Requirement for Section 875(c), 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837, 1842–43
(2008). Negligence, however, is an objective test which typically only considers whether a
reasonable person—not the defendant—“should be aware” of the risk. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(2)(d).
37. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)–(c).
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intent, it has declined to identify which level of intent § 875(c) requires.38
The Ninth Circuit requires at least “knowledge” that the recipient will
view the communication as a threat.39
The subjective intent element does not replace either of the tests
required by the majority of circuits, rather, it is included as an additional
analysis under the statute’s second, true threat element.40 Subjective
intent determinations turn on more than the defendant’s explanations of
their intentions—juries may consider the entire context of the defendant’s
statements, including the tone of the statements, the defendant’s
relationship with people mentioned in the statements, the defendant’s
prior warnings regarding threatening statements, and any other relevant
circumstances.41 Subjective intent also potentially allows for additional
defenses that are not available under objective or general intent analyses,
including the lack of requisite intent due to intoxication or diminished
capacity.42
II. ELONIS V. UNITED STATES AND A FAILURE TO CLARIFY INTENT
The Supreme Court’s holding in Elonis v. United States43 rejected the
position of nine circuit courts and determined that § 875(c) requires that
a defendant subjectively intended to communicate a threat.44 The Court
began its evaluation of the statutory requirements with a reading of the
statute’s plain language.45 The Court rejected both parties’ arguments for
inferring a mental state from the statutory language and concluded that,

38. See Heineman, 767 F.3d at 973 & n.2; see also id. at 983 (Baldock, J., concurring in
judgment only) (indicating that the court declined to decide the appropriate level of intent).
39. See Twine, 853 F.2d at 680; see also United States v. King, 122 F.3d 808, 811 (9th Cir.
1997) (Farris, J., concurring) (clarifying that the Twine court held that specific intent required
knowledge or purpose). Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion based on its own
precedent, long before Virginia v. Black raised the subjective intent issue.
40. See United States v. Wheeler, 776 F.3d 736, 743 n.3 (10th Cir. 2015) (“This court’s
recent decision in Heineman does not alter this standard. Heineman dealt solely with the mens rea
required under § 875(c) and does not alter the objective, reasonable person standard for
determining what constitutes a true threat.”); United States v. Vaksman, 472 Fed. Appx. 447, 448
(9th Cir. 2012). Requiring a subjective and objective test again ensures that triers of fact only
convict those defendants whose communications are understood as threats. Logically, if a
defendant intends to make a threat, but no other reasonable person would understand the statement
as a threat, there is no harm.
41. See Vaksman, 472 Fed. Appx. at 449.
42. See Twine, 853 F.2d at 679–81.
43. 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
44. Id. at 2011.
45. Id. at 2008–09.
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on its face, the statute does not require any intent.46 However, the Court
decided that it would not view the absence of express intent as an
intentional omission by Congress, stating, “We have repeatedly held that
‘mere omission from a criminal enactment of any mention of criminal
intent’ should not be read ‘as dispensing with it.’”47 To the contrary,
principles of criminal law generally favor inclusion of some intent in
order to distinguish the innocent from the guilty.48
The Court carefully noted that when implying an intent requirement,
“we read into the statute ‘only that mens rea which is necessary to
separate wrongful conduct from otherwise innocent conduct.’”49 The
district court’s jury instruction, which permitted conviction based solely
on a reasonable person’s interpretation of his statements, bore a striking
similarity to a negligence standard and could not have distinguished
innocent from wrongful conduct because it failed to take into account
Elonis’s reasons for making the statements.50 Beyond holding that
negligence is insufficient to satisfy § 875(c), the Court refused to decide
which level of intent—knowledge or recklessness—would support a
conviction, on the grounds that the parties had not briefed the issue and
there was no current circuit split.51 The Court further declined to address
any attendant First Amendment issues, because it had already determined
the jury instruction conflicted with principles of criminal law requiring
subjective intent.52
Both Justice Samuel Alito’s concurrence and Justice Clarence
Thomas’s dissent took issue with the majority’s refusal to clarify the
requisite level of intent, predicting the opinion would lead to confusion
and inconsistency in the circuit courts.53 Justice Alito, in particular, went
46. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012). Note that the Court used terms such as “mental
state,” “mens rea,” and “scienter” interchangeably to indicate what this Comment refers to as
“intent.”
47. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2009 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250
(1952)).
48. Id. In support of this finding, the Court cited five cases in which it imputed, to a variety
of statutes, an additional intent requirement. See id. at 2009–10. What is notable about the cited
precedent is that in each case the Court applied an additional knowledge requirement. See id.
49. Id. at 2010 (quoting Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000)).
50. See id. at 2011.
51. See id. at 2012–13.
52. See id. at 2012. On the basis of its determination that the jury instruction was improper,
the Court reversed the defendant’s conviction and remanded the case for consideration of whether
the defendant had the requisite subjective intent. Id. at 2013.
53. See id. at 2013 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2018 (Thomas,
J., dissenting). Justice Thomas’s dissent proceeded upon the understanding that common law
obligated the majority to apply a “default rule” of general intent, in the absence of an express
indication of Congress’s intent to “dispense with” a required mental state. See id. at 2019. This
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into great detail explaining why the majority could have, and should have,
gone further with its holding. He disagreed with the Court’s claim that
the parties had not addressed their preferred level of intent and pointed to
the parties’ responses at oral argument to queries regarding a recklessness
standard.54 Justice Alito, while agreeing with the majority’s general
finding that § 875(c) requires subjective intent, built on the opinion by
declaring recklessness the appropriate level of intent.55 He reasoned that
a recklessness standard would identify culpable conduct while stopping
short of intruding on Congress’s legislative authority.56
Justice Alito continued with an explanation of why a recklessness
standard, if adopted, would not infringe on the First Amendment.57 He
reiterated the lack of First Amendment protection for true threats,
emphasizing their negligible social value and their serious emotional, and
potentially physical, harms.58 He also highlighted an important paradox
that persists in all threat jurisprudence: Any threat—whether the result of
mistake, ill-attempted humor, or the worst of intentions—causes the same
distress.59 Justice Alito concluded his constitutional discussion by
asserting that a recklessness standard would not have an untenable
“chilling effect”60 on constitutional speech.61
As suggested by Justice Alito, the Elonis majority unnecessarily
bypassed an opportunity to resolve the intent question and provide lower
courts with a clear standard to apply in future § 875(c) cases. The reasons
offered by the Court for avoiding a specific intent standard as well as a
First Amendment analysis were not compelling. First, at the time the
Comment assumes the majority was correct in concluding § 875(c) requires some degree of
specific, subjective intent and thus will not discuss the dissent’s reasoning at length.
54. Id. at 2014 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Specifically, the
Government argued that recklessness would be suitable, while Elonis argued for a higher standard.
See id. Justice Alito reasoned that if the Court desired additional discussion of the intent level, it
could request supplementary briefing or further argument, rather than deferring an answer to a
question it was capable of resolving. Id.
55. Id. at 2014–15.
56. See id. at 2015.
57. See id. at 2016.
58. See id. Elonis’s contentions that his “rap lyrics” were “works of art” apparently did not
impress Justice Alito. See id. Justice Alito dismissed the idea that “amateurs” who post on social
media are entitled to the same protections as professional musicians, particularly considering the
vastly different contexts of direct threats made online and threats made during a public
performance. Id. Justice Alito further questioned the innocence of Elonis’s motives, considering
evidence that Elonis posted the threats so that his wife would see them. See id. at 2017.
59. See id. at 2016.
60. See generally Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1633, 1639–40 (2013) (discussing and criticizing the chilling effect in First Amendment
cases).
61. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2017 (drawing a parallel to civil and criminal liability for libel).
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Court decided Elonis, there was, arguably, the beginning of a circuit split
between the Ninth and Tenth Circuit on the exact issue facing the Court—
whether § 875(c) requires a reckless or knowing level of intent.62 Thus,
the Court could have resolved the emerging split without exceeding its
authority. Second, as repeatedly stated in Supreme Court precedent,
courts must interpret any statute regulating pure speech within the bounds
of the First Amendment.63 Thus, even though the Court’s holding was
derived solely from principles of criminal law and statutory construction,
because it altered the interpretation of a statute restricting pure speech,
the Court should have at least confirmed that the changes were consistent
with First Amendment precedent.
In light of the Supreme Court’s consistent line of precedent on mens
rea inferences, as well as the numerous existing sources upon which the
Court could have based its reasoning,64 it is surprising that the Elonis
Court deferred a decision on the level of intent required for § 875(c). As
noted above, the precedent cited in support of the Court’s ability to infer
intent strongly suggests an additional conclusion—when the Court
imputes a statutory mens rea requirement, it nearly always requires
knowledge.65 In the context of § 875(c), a subjective intent of knowledge
fits well with principles of statutory construction, is easily applied by
circuit courts, and satisfies constitutional demands.

62. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. As mentioned above, the Ninth and
Tenth Circuits, although both requiring subjective intent, have somewhat different approaches.
The Ninth Circuit has established knowledge as the proper intent level, while the Tenth Circuit
has yet to choose either knowledge or recklessness. While perhaps not precisely the typical
“circuit split,” the two circuits’ differing approaches certainly indicate some level of uncertainty
already existed in the lower courts when Elonis was decided.
63. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969); see also Virginia v. Black, 538
U.S. 343, 363 (2003) (plurality opinion).
64. For example, as Justice Alito argued in his concurrence, the majority had at its disposal
the parties’ existing argument and could have requested additional arguments or supplemental
briefs to consider the intent issue in greater depth. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001,
2014 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Moreover, the Court could have
given greater consideration to the arguments raised by Justice Alito in favor of a recklessness
standard and perhaps weighed his reasoning against the Ninth Circuit’s basis for selecting a
knowledge standard. Even the Model Penal Code offers a recommendation on selecting a degree
of “culpability” when a statute is silent on the subject. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3). In sum,
the Court could have relied on any or all of these sources to gain sufficient knowledge and reach
an informed opinion on the proper level of intent.
65. See supra note 48; see also Rosenfield, supra note 36, at 1865 (“Knowledge is a
common denominator in the Supreme Court cases which considered a statute silent on the mens
rea requirement.”).
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III. KNOWLEDGE IS THE LIKELY STANDARD FOR § 875(C) VIOLATIONS
Preliminarily, it is interesting to note the Court’s tendency to ascribe
a knowledge requirement when Congress fails to expressly provide for a
particular mens rea requirement. To support its decision in Elonis, the
majority cited at least five cases where the Court imputed a mens rea
requirement and in each case, knowledge was the chosen standard.66
Although such a small sample of cases certainly cannot predict which
standard will ultimately prevail in § 875(c), the reasoning used in the
cited cases is remarkably similar to that which decided Elonis. In each
case, the majority emphasized the traditional requirement of an “evilmeaning mind” to support a criminal conviction.67 The Court was careful
to distinguish between public welfare offenses, which require no
subjective intent for conviction and receive light punishment, and the
criminal offense at issue in each case, which carried harsher penalties.68
Notably, most of the offenses in the cited cases involve prohibited use,
possession, or sale of certain items.69 Only one case, X-Citement Video,
involved arguable First Amendment concerns.70 It is reasonable to
believe that the Court will retain a similar, if not heightened, interest in
identifying truly guilty conduct when assessing § 875(c), which runs a
higher risk of proscribing constitutionally protected speech.
A knowledge standard is also consistent with the majority’s expressed
aim of selecting the level of intent that best separates the innocent from
the morally culpable.71 Distinguishing between innocence and guilt in the
context of threats is particularly difficult because, as implied by Justice
Alito’s concurring opinion, the harm resulting from threats is often the
same, regardless of the speaker’s intent.72 Thus, contrary to what some
commentators suggest, it is unhelpful to measure “wrongfulness” relative

66. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2009–10 (citing Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511
U.S. 513 (1994); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994); Staples v. United
States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985); Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952)).
67. E.g., Morissette, 342 U.S. at 251.
68. Id. at 253–56. A violation of a public welfare offense often will “result in no direct or
immediate injury to person or property but merely create the danger or probability of it which the
law seeks to minimize.” Id. at 256. Violations of these regulations generally result in relatively
minor punishments. Id. In contrast, § 875(c) carries a penalty of up to five years of imprisonment.
18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012).
69. See, e.g., Liparota, 471 U.S. at 420 (food stamps); Posters ‘N’ Things, 511 U.S. at 515
(drug paraphernalia); X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 66 (child pornography); Staples, 511 U.S. at
602 (automatic weapons).
70. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 71–72.
71. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2010.
72. See id. at 2016 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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to the harms the threat statute seeks to prevent.73 Instead, it makes more
sense to focus on which level of intent seems most clearly culpable,
considering the typical circumstances that would fall under each level of
intent. For example, a defendant who attempts to delete any “friends”
who could view his posts before commanding his “religious followers”
to “kill cops” might evidence recklessness.74This behavior would
typically be reckless because the statements are more general in nature,
and most defendants would be aware of the substantial risk that posts on
social media will become public, even after taking steps to make the post
private. On the other hand, conduct like Elonis’s almost certainly
qualifies as knowing.75 There was no suggestion that Elonis deleted
Facebook friends or added privacy settings before posting threatening
“lyrics,” many of which directly referenced specific people who would
likely become aware of the posts.76 Comparing the two examples, the
facts supporting knowing intent are much more evidently “wrongful”
than those supporting recklessness. Thus, a knowledge requirement
comports best with the Court’s stated intention to separate the innocent
from the morally culpable.
As a practical matter, the Ninth Circuit’s lengthy history of using a
knowledge standard for § 875(c) will provide helpful guidance for other
courts applying the standard for the first time. The Ninth Circuit’s cases
are particularly instructive on which fact patterns may call for different
treatment under the new standard. For example, as noted above, a
knowledge requirement, which requires that a defendant is “practically
certain” his message would be interpreted as a threat, may—unlike a
recklessness standard—be defeated by a lack of requisite intent, for
reasons including intoxication or diminished capacity.77 Another possible
defense that was previously unavailable is that a defendant did not intend
that anyone receive the message, because if the defendant did not mean
to share the statement, then he could hardly be practically certain it would

73. See Leading Case, Federal Threats Statute—Mens Rea and the First Amendment—
Elonis v. United States, 129 HARV. L. REV. 331, 337 (2015).
74. See infra note 78 and accompanying text. It is unlikely that a trier of fact could construe
the same circumstances as rising to the level of knowing intent, which would require that the
defendant was “practically certain” a recipient would interpret his posts as a threat. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (2015). It is also important to note that a case involving these facts would not
be defeated through the “knowing transmission” requirement, because the defendant intentionally
posted the statements.
75. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2004–07; see also id. at 2016 (Alito, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (implying that Elonis may have even posted the statements with the purpose of
threatening his wife).
76. See id. at 2004–07 (majority opinion).
77. See United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 679–81 (9th Cir. 1988).
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be understood as anything, much less a threat.78 A more complicated
scenario will require a jury to evaluate a defendant’s knowing
transmission of a threat when the defendant was making the statements
to a confidante.79 Courts, however, may be reluctant to apply a heightened
knowledge standard, fearing it will hinder convictions of guilty parties.
But outside of the fairly limited fact patterns discussed immediately
above, the new subjective intent requirement is unlikely to substantially
interfere with the ability to indict and convict defendants guilty of making
threats.80
A knowledge standard is also more likely than a recklessness standard
to uphold the principles of the First Amendment. Although the Elonis
majority seemed willing to set aside constitutional considerations, the
First Amendment will undoubtedly factor in to any future clarification of
§ 875(c)’s requisite intent. In selecting a standard, the Court will be
careful to draw a clear line between threats and protected speech.81
Although Justice Alito suggested in his concurrence that a recklessness
standard would not offend the First Amendment, his conclusions seemed
rooted more in discussion of the harms of threats than in identifiable
precedent.82 He did, however, point to libel as an area of speech
regulation that only requires a recklessness standard.83 Likewise, Justice
Thomas’s dissent also condemned any inclusion of a heightened level of
intent, arguing that providing additional safeguards would “make threats
one of the most protected categories of unprotected speech.”84 Justice
78. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 776 F.3d 736, 739–41, 746 (10th Cir. 2015)
(discussing the defendant’s contention that he believed he deleted all his Facebook friends before
making the alleged threatening posts, then reversing and remanding the case for retrial due to the
trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury that the defendant subjectively intended his Facebook posts
to be threatening).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Houston, 792 F.3d 663, 665–68, 670 (6th Cir. 2015)
(reversing, for plain error, defendant’s conviction due to improper jury instruction on the issue of
intent, finding that a jury could view the defendant’s statements to his girlfriend as “venting his
frustration”). Situations involving statements to a confidante, such as a close friend, romantic
partner, or family member, become particularly complex when, like in the Houston case, someone
who is not part of the conversation becomes aware of the statements. See id. at 665. While the
confidante may have understood the statements as “venting,” and felt no need to report them to
the police, an outside observer does not have the same understanding of the defendant’s typical
behavior and may be more likely to view the statements as threatening.
80. See, e.g., Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2026 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting Government
counsel’s remark: “I think Congress would well have understood that the majority of these cases
probably [involved] people who intended to threaten” (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
81. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969).
82. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2016–17 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83. See id. at 2017.
84. See id. at 2027 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Thomas listed additional categories of unprotected speech requiring only
general intent.85 Both of these viewpoints, however, overlook the more
compelling example provided by the majority opinion—Supreme Court
precedent requires a heightened, knowing intent for conviction under a
statute criminalizing the distribution of child pornography.86 If the Court
is willing to provide heightened First Amendment protection for those
accused of distributing child pornography, it seems likely the Court will
have no trouble applying a similarly heightened knowledge requirement
for a conviction under the threat statute.87
CONCLUSION
Although the Court passed up the opportunity to reach a clear holding
on whether § 875(c) requires reckless or knowing intent and likewise
avoided the attendant First Amendment considerations, existing Supreme
Court precedent and circuit court opinions provide helpful guidance.
Courts can expect that if the Supreme Court reconsiders § 875(c)’s intent
requirement in the future, it will almost certainly select a knowledge
standard.88 Proceeding under this reasoning, courts have the benefit of
Ninth Circuit case law, which has been applying a subjective, knowing
intent element to § 875(c) for nearly thirty years.89 By relying on the
Court’s precedent and Ninth Circuit guidance, lower courts may avoid
the confusion predicted by Justices Alito and Thomas90 and have a greater
degree of confidence that their chosen standard complies with the
demands of the Constitution.

85. See id. (discussing the “fighting words” exception’s general intent standard). However,
the “fighting words” exception is one of the more archaic—not to mention one of the most
criticized—exceptions to the First Amendment. See generally Burton Caine, The Trouble with
“Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire Is a Threat to First Amendment Values and
Should Be Overruled, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 444 (2004) (“There is no constitutional basis for
denying protection to fighting words . . . .”); Wendy B. Reilly, Note, Fighting the Fighting Words
Standard: A Call for Its Destruction, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 947, 949 (2000) (criticizing the
development and application of the fighting words standard).
86. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2010 (majority opinion) (citing United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 73 (1994)).
87. See Kendrick, supra note 60, at 1666 (“The fact that sexual speech receives more
protection than production of some public information [in certain defamation cases] makes it all
the more difficult to rationalize the existing intent requirements . . . .”).
88. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1988).
90. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2013 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at
2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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